Privatizing Florida’s Road to Reentry

by Neil Gallagher | October 28, 2025

Photo by the author of a van used by one of the for-profit re-entry companies

Florida’s Work Release Programs

Florida, like many states, has long experimented with work release and reentry programs as a way to bridge the gap between incarceration and reintegration into society. Work release programs, which allow incarcerated individuals nearing the end of their sentences to work in the community during the day and return to their facilities at night, have existed since the early 1920s at the national level.[1] Florida adopted the model early on, officially authorizing work release programs in 1967 to prepare inmates for reentry. The expansion of these programs grew significantly during the prison boom of the 1980s and 1990s, when Florida’s prison admissions doubled between 1985 and 1988.[2]

The Expansion and Privatization of Community Work Release Programs

As Florida’s incarcerated population surged, Community Work Release Programs (CWR) provided a cost-effective solution to address overcrowding. However, this expansion led to concerns when some participants in the program committed violent crimes, causing public support for the program to decline.[3] In response, the Florida Department of Corrections (FDC) began experimenting with private contractors to fill the gap left by the closure of some state-run CWR centers. By 2007, private contractors managed 30% of Florida’s work release beds. This number has increased today, with private contractors operating 21 out of 30 centers (70%), primarily through nonprofit organizations like The Transition House (TTH) and Bridges International.[4] [5]

The Fragmented System: State vs. Private Facilities

Florida now operates a hybrid system with both state-run and private-run CWR centers.[6] Although these private centers report positive outcomes in recidivism reduction, employment rates, and earnings, the system remains fragmented, with significant differences in management practices. For example, some private centers, like The Transition House and Bridges International, deviate from FDC guidelines in staffing levels, substance abuse programming, and healthcare provisions.[7]

Financial Structure and Earnings Deductions

Incarcerated people in work release programs are subject to several earnings deductions. Florida Statutes mandate that 55% of their wages be deducted for room and board. Additionally, the law requires deductions of 10% for court costs and restitution, 10% for family obligations (if applicable), and 10% for a savings account to aid reentry. This leaves some incarcerated people with only 15% of their income (25%, including savings).[8] Although these deductions help cover confinement costs and support the individual’s transition, they leave many with insufficient funds for reintegration.[9] Some facilities have imposed additional restrictions on the amounts incarcerated people can withdraw, further limiting their financial autonomy.[10]

Discrepancies in Program Implementation Across Facilities

While the FDC sets the framework for work release programs, implementation varies across facilities, especially private contractors. For example:

1. Educational and Volunteering Restrictions: Florida Statutes allow incarcerated people on work release to engage in educational programming, training, and volunteer activities, but private contractors sometimes restrict these opportunities.[11] For instance, The Transition House of Bartow prohibits participants from taking college courses or volunteering in the local community, which limits personal development and community reintegration.[12]
2. Substance Abuse Programs: While state-run centers follow standardized substance abuse treatment programs, private contractors can create their own curricula. This flexibility can lead to variations in program quality and effectiveness.
3. Staffing Levels: Private centers, like The Transition House, have failed to meet staffing requirements, especially during night shifts. These deficiencies raise concerns about security and inmate well-being.[13]
4. Healthcare Responsibility: Incarcerated people in state-run facilities receive healthcare through state-contracted providers, with a $5 copay. In contrast, incarcerated people in private work release centers must cover their own healthcare costs, often through employer-sponsored plans. Those without insurance may need to register as indigent to receive free healthcare through the county. This situation creates potential gaps in care for individuals unable to afford treatment.[14] Further, those who are injured and unable to work are often returned to prison.

Employment and Transportation Challenges

Incarcerated people must find their own employment, often relying on partnerships between employers and work release centers, personal networks, or job postings.[15] Some facilities, like The Transition House, impose restrictions on the types of jobs participants can take, such as limiting them to fixed-location jobs rather than those involving non-fixed work locations (e.g., landscaping, construction, delivery). These restrictions limit employment opportunities and hinder participants' chances to find meaningful work.

Additionally, participants are responsible for their own transportation to and from work. While facilities often provide transportation, they charge $3 per trip regardless of distance or the number of individuals traveling together. Previously, private contractors handled the transportation responsibility, but now the work release centers manage it directly, placing the financial burden on the incarcerated participants.[16][17]

Financial Mismanagement and Oversight

Although Florida Statutes set guidelines for incarcerated people’s earnings and deductions, private contractors occasionally mismanage incarcerated people’s funds. For instance, recent audits conducted by the Florida Office of the Inspector General have shown that The Transition House did not consistently manage participants’ trust accounts, failing to deposit court-ordered payments promptly.[18] These issues complicate participants’ financial autonomy, making it harder for them to meet their financial obligations and save for post-release housing.

In 2022, The Transition House of Bartow limited the weekly withdrawal amount from participant accounts to $30, despite Florida Statutes allowing up to $50 per week for personal expenses.[19] This restriction further diminished participants’ ability to manage their finances. Participants are responsible for purchasing their own phone plans, hygiene items, laundry services, clothing, and food to supplement their diet.

Audits of Private Contractors

Audits conducted by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) have found deficiencies in The Transition House facilities. For example, an audit identified several issues:

1. Inaccurate Financial Record-Keeping: The facility did not enter all the incarcerated people’s earnings into the trust accounts, and no determination could be made as to whether the funds had been properly documented.[20]
2. Lack of Receipts: The facility failed to provide receipts for some deposits or withdrawals from participants’ trust accounts.[21]
3. Non-compliance with Family Deductions: Not all participants paid the required family dependent deductions.[22]
4. Delayed Fund Transfers: The facility did not always forward the balance of terminated participants’ accounts to the Department in a timely manner.
5. Substance Abuse Programming: The facility lacked sufficient documentation to determine whether participants received the required hours of substance abuse programming from credentialed counselors.[23][24]
6. Staffing Deficiencies: The facility did not always meet the staffing levels required during the night shift.[25]
7. Education Deficiencies: The Transition House did not meet the required number of weekly hours for educational programming that it was contractually required to conduct.[26]

Furthermore, The Transition House of Bartow frequently provided its incarcerated participants with meals that significantly deviated from Florida DOC guidelines, offering food donated by businesses like 7-11 (the gas station) rather than preparing meals as stipulated in their contract.[27]

In contrast, audits of Bridges International have found no significant deficiencies outside of those previously reported. The company implemented a corrective action plan to address minor issues.[28][29]

Policy Critiques: Privatization of Reentry Programs

The privatization of Florida’s reentry programs raises significant concerns. Critics argue that private contractors may prioritize profits over the rehabilitation of incarcerated people, undermining the quality of services. Gaps in oversight, such as the Sunshine transportation scandal, where participants were charged excessive fees for transportation, further fuel these concerns.[30]

Advocates for state-run programs argue that state facilities offer better accountability and can integrate reentry services with other state resources. Though private programs like Bridges International and The Transition House have reported success in reducing recidivism and securing employment, the lack of consistent oversight and the potential for cost-cutting measures present risks.[31]

Future Directions for Florida’s Work Release Programs

Florida’s hybrid work release model has shown success, but the privatization of reentry programs presents challenges that must be addressed. To ensure successful reintegration, Florida must implement better oversight and more transparency and reconsider the financial and moral costs associated with privatization. The state should continue to examine its approach and ensure it aligns to support incarcerated people through meaningful rehabilitation and reintegration into society.

[1] Fla. S. Comm. on Crim. Just., A Review of the Department of Corrections’ Inmate Work-Release Law, S. Interim Project Report 2004-127, at 3–4 (2004), https://www.flsenate.gov/UserContent/Session/2004/InterimReports/pdf/2004-127cj.pdf.

[2] Id.

[3] Id.

[4] Fla. Office of Program Policy Analysis & Gov’t Accountability, Higher Priority Should Be Given to Transition Services to Reduce Inmate Recidivism, Report No. 07-17, at 6 (Feb. 2007), https://oppaga.fl.gov/Documents/Reports/07-17.pdf.

[5] Nick Evans, Prison Transition Groups Line Up Against Corrections Dept., WFSU (Oct. 13, 2016), https://news.wfsu.org/state-news/2016-10-13/prison-transition-groups-line-up-against-corrections-dept.

[6] Fla. Office of Program Policy Analysis & Gov’t Accountability, supra note 4, at 6.

[7] Fla. Dep’t of Corr., Office of the Inspector Gen., Annual Report FY 2020–21, at 14–17, 19-20 (2021), https://fdc.myflorida.com/pub/ig/Annual/2020-21.html.

[8] Fla. Revenue Estimating Conf., Inmate Subsistence Fee at DOC-Operated Work Release Centers, at 1 (Mar. 5, 2009), https://www.edr.state.fl.us/Content/conferences/revenueimpact/archives/2009/pdf/page122-124.pdf.

[9] Captive Labor: Exploitation of Incarcerated Workers, ACLU of Fla. (June 15, 2022), https://www.aclufl.org/en/news... (“Almost 70 percent . . . were not able to afford basic necessities with their prison wages”).

[10] Interview with Anonymous Inmate, Transition House, Bartow, Fla. (Feb. 2023) (notes on file with author)

[11] Fla. Admin. Code Ann. R. 33‑601.602(e), (g) (2025) (defining “Community Study Release” and “Community Volunteer Service”).

[12] Inmate Request Forms from an Inmate Who Wishes to Remain Anonymous, Transition House, Bartow, Fla. (Feb. 2023) (on file with author).

[13] Annual Report FY 2020–21, supra note 7, at 19.

[14] Fla. Admin. Code Ann. R. 33‑601.602(i)(1)–(2) (2020).

[15] Inmate Rule Manual, Transition House, Bartow, Fla. (Aug. 2022) (on file with author).

[16] David M. Reutter, Florida Work Release Prisoners Ripped Off by Private Transport Company, Prison Legal News (May 2004) at 10.

[17] Fla. S. Comm. on Crim. Just., A Review of the Department of Corrections’ Inmate Work-Release Law, S. Rep. No. 2004-127, at 7 (2004).

[18] Fla. Dep’t of Corr., Office of the Inspector Gen., Annual Report FY 2017–18, at 14-15, 17-19 (2018), https://fdc.myflorida.com/pub/ig/Annual/2017-18.html.

[19] Interview with Anonymous Inmate, Transition House, Bartow, Fla. (Feb. 2023) (notes on file with author).

[20] Annual Report FY 2020–21, supra note 7, at 14-15.

[21] Id. at 15.

[22] Annual Report FY 2017–18, supra note 18, at 17.

[23] Annual Report FY 2020–21, supra note 7, at 18.

[24] Annual Report FY 2017–18, supra note 18, at 17.

[25] Annual Report FY 2020–21, supra note 7, at 19.

[26] Id. at 19-20.

[27] Photographs Provided by an Inmate Who Wishes to Remain Anonymous, Transition House, Bartow, Fla. (Feb. 2023) (on file with author).

[28] Annual Report FY 2020–21, supra note 7, at 14, 16–17.

[29] Annual Report FY 2017–18, supra note 18, at 14.

[30] Reutter, supra note 16, at 10.

[31] Fla. Dep’t of Corr., Recidivism Outcomes Comparing Private and Public Correctional Facilities in Florida, at 51–56 (Dec. 2005), https://fdc.myflorida.com/pub/recidivismstudy.pdf.